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Over the last fifteen years, truth commissions have been the 
subjects of an enormous amount of literature. However, the bulk of that 
literature has focused on a few relatively prominent cases, among which 
the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission is the most 
prominent. 1  English-language academic literature on Korean truth 
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1  ERIC WIEBELHAUS-BRAHM, TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND TRANSITIONAL 
SOCIETIES: THE IMPACT ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY 8 (2010). 
28 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal Vol. 14:3 
commissions, on the other hand, is comparatively sparse.2 Those articles 
that have been published on the subject have concentrated on exposing the 
substantive findings of specific truth commissions to a larger audience.3 
Additionally, broader studies have been undertaken focusing on the 
development of post-1987 transitional justice in Korea, but these works 
often give relatively little detailed attention to the role of truth 
commissions.4  
 To some extent, the lack of studies on Korean truth commissions is 
surprising. Truth commissions have played a particularly important role in 
Korea’s recent politics, where at least ten have been implemented over the 
past fifteen years.5 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Korea 
(“TRCK”), which had a broad mandate and addressed several 
controversial cases, played an especially prominent role in addressing 
Korea’s recent past.6 Despite the fact that the TRCK has now written its 
final report and shut its doors, truth commissions still play an important 
role in the political and social discourse regarding how to deal with the 
past. 
 It is the objective of this article to begin to fill this gap in the 
                                                
2 This article will use the terms “Korea” and “Korean” to refer to the Republic of 
Korea (South Korea). 
3 See, e.g., Gavan McCormack & Kim Dong-Choon, Grappling with Cold War 
History: Korea’s Embattled Truth and Reconciliation Commission, THE ASIA-PAC. J. 8-6-
09 (Feb. 21, 2009), http://japanfocus.org/-Kim-Dong_choon/3056; Hong Seuk-Ryule, 
Finding the Truths on the Suspicious Deaths Under South Korea’s Military Dictatorship, 
42 KOREA J. 139 (2002); Hunjoon Kim, Seeking Truth after 50 Years: The National 
Committee for Investigation of the Truth about the Jeju 4.3 Events, 3 INT’L J. 
TRANSITIONAL JUST. 406 (2009).  
4 See, e.g., KOREA IN THE GLOBAL WAVE OF DEMOCRATIZATION (Doh Chull Shin 
et al. eds. 1994); POLITICS AND ECONOMY OF REGIME TRANSFORMATIONS: CASE STUDIES 
OF SOUTH KOREA AND CENTRAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (Chung-Si Ahn & Chon-Pyo 
Lee, eds. 1999). Many of these works have been comparative in nature. See Sang Wook 
& Daniel Han, Transitional Justice: When Justice Strikes Back—Case Studies of Delayed 
Justice in Argentina and South Korea, 30 HOUSTON J. INT’L L. 653 (2008); Geoff 
Gentilucci, Truth-Telling and Accountability in Democratizing Nations: The Cases 
Against Chile’s Augusto Pinochet and South Korea’s Chun Doo-Hwan and Roh Tae-Woo, 
5 CONN. PUB. INTEREST L. J. 79 (2005); Terence Roehrig, Human Rights, the Military, 
and the Transition to Democracy in Argentina and South Korea, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
SOCIETIES IN TRANSITION: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, RESPONSES 389-412 (Shale 
Horowitz & Albrecht Schnabel, eds., 2004). 
5 Young Jo Lee, Commissioning the Past: South Korean Efforts at Truth and 
Justice after Democratization, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND BEYOND IN SOUTH KOREA: 





6 See infra Part III. 
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literature by outlining in more detail the ongoing development of truth 
commissions in Korea. This article will first review the development of 
truth commissions in Korea over time, starting with their pre-modern 
historical antecedents. This will lead into a discussion on the proliferation 
of issue-specific truth commissions starting in 1996, the work of the 
TRCK, and the role of truth commissions in Korea’s highly polarized 
political landscape. By highlighting the long history of truth finding in 
Korea, this article will contribute to a growing literature that examines the 
disparate geographical and historical origins of truth commissions and 
other transitional justice mechanisms.7 The article will then discuss some 
of the particularities of Korean truth commissions before concluding with 
some thoughts on the future evolution of truth commissions in Korea.  
There is much debate among academics as to the exact definition 
of a truth commission.8 Some have proposed relatively narrow definitions, 
such as Freeman’s characterization of a truth commission as an: 
ad hoc, autonomous, and victim-centered commission of 
inquiry set up in and authorized by a state for the primary 
purposes of (1) investigating and reporting on the principal 
causes and consequences of broad and relatively recent 
patterns of severe violence or repression that occurred in 
the state during determinate periods of abusive rule or 
conflict, and (2) making recommendations for their redress 
and future prevention.9  
                                                
7 See, e.g., MARK FREEMAN, TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS 
22-24 (2006) (showing that truth commissions in Commonwealth countries are 
institutionally modeled on their domestic tradition of Commonwealth Commissions of 
Inquiry); Brian Loveman & Elizabeth Lira, Truth, Justice, Reconciliation, and Impunity 
as Historical Themes: Chile, 1814–2006, 97 RADICAL HIST. REV. 43 (2007) 
(demonstrating that truth commissions in Chile have their roots in that country’s long 
history of governmental commissions and constitutional accusations); Erin Daly, Between 
Punitive and Reconstructive Justice: The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L 
& POL. 355, 378 (2002) (discussing the indigenous nature of Rwanda’s Gacaca courts). 
Other authors have instead stressed the influence of the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission on contemporary truth commissions rather than indigenous 
norms. See Robert Rotberg, Truth Commissions and the Provision of Truth, Justice, and 
Reconciliation, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 3, 6 
(Robert Rotberg & Dennis Thompson, eds., 2000) (“The South African commission has 
become the model for all future commissions”); Audrey R. Chapman & Hugo Van Der 
Merwe, Assessing the South African Transitional Justice Model, in TRUTH AND 
RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA: DID THE TRC DELIVER? 1, 8 (Audrey R. Chapman & 
Hugo Van Der Merwe, eds., 2008). 
8 See generally Eric Brahm, What is a Truth Commission and Why does It 
Matter?, 3 PEACE & CONFLICT REV. 1 (2009), available at 
http://www.review.upeace.org/index.cfm?opcion=0&ejemplar=17&entrada=83.  
9 Freeman, supra note 7, at 18. 
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This definition excludes all investigative commissions that are event-
specific, thematic, institutional, or not focused on the “relatively recent” 
past.10 Other experts take a broader view. For example, Hayner’s widely 
used definition of a truth commission as a body “set up to investigate a 
past history of violations of human rights in a particular country—which 
can include violations by the military or other government forces or armed 
opposition forces.”11 This article will adopt Hayner’s broad definition, 
which seems to best reflect the term’s usage by Korean legislators and 
commentators.12  
II. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS  
Although truth commissions are often seen as quintessentially 
modern reactions to the imperative of addressing past human rights 
abuses, in Korea there is an extraordinarily long and important tradition of 
truth-seeking exercises as an integral part of political transition. It can be 
argued that such traditional methods are antecedents to the current wave of 
truth commissions that have been so strongly embraced in Korea. The core 
document in traditional historical truth-seeking in pre-modern Korea was 
the sillok, a written history of a monarch’s reign, composed after their 
death based on records compiled by court historians during his lifetime.13 
While the sillok tradition had been present in other Confucian states and 
previous Korean dynasties, it became a custom of particular importance 
during the time of Korea’s highly Confucian Chosun Dynasty (1391-
1910).14 
Although silloks dealt with a variety of social, economic, cultural 
and political matters, the central theme was the Confucian morality of the 
                                                
10 Id. In fact, most states have established truth commissions within two years of 
a transition. Geoff Dancy, Hunjoon Kim & Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm, The Turn to Truth: 
Trends in Truth Commission Experimentation, 9 J. HUM. RTS. 45, 57 (2010). 
11 Priscilla Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions—1974 to 1994: A Comparative 
Study, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 597, 604 (1994). See Brahm, supra note 8, at 4, for a list of other 
broad definitions adopted by commentators. 
12 While Freeman’s narrower definition may be appropriate in some contexts, it 
seems ill-suited to the Korean situation, where socio-historical issues, such as 
collaboration with the Japanese, have important real-world consequences for living 
individuals. In fact, these issues are dealt with by bodies that are similar in function and 
composition to those that deal with abuses from the authoritarian era. In the case of the 
TRCK, one single body dealt with both eras. In addition, it seems arbitrary to classify an 
event-specific body, such as the Commission on Identification and Restitution of No Gun 
Ri Victims, as fundamentally different than the TRCK, which had a broader mandate, but 
otherwise served a similar function. 
13 Hang Nyeong Oh, The Meaning of Ritual Practices in the Compilation of the 
Choson Sillok, in THE INSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF CIVIL GOVERNANCE IN THE CHOSON 
DYNASTY 161, 162 (John Duncan et al. eds., 2009). 
14 Id. 
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previous king (the Chosun monarchs were all male) and his officials.15 
There was a strong emphasis on restoring the familial honor and 
reputation of the morally upright members of the prior regime, while 
morally corrupt officials were condemned.16 In a society based upon 
Confucianism, these conclusions mattered. As one historian notes, 
“[c]ampaigns were frequently waged by aggrieved descendants for the 
posthumous redress of punishment to their ancestors. And in like manner, 
the posthumous punishment of deceased enemies by the contemporary 
ruling group was regarded as a matter of prime importance. Old scores 
were settled in the pages of history.”17 In terms of historiographic style, 
the traditional silloks were written in a straightforward descriptive manner 
with very little analysis aside from judgments of the behavior of the main 
actors.18  
The silloks themselves were intended to be objective, and the 
compilers and court historians were therefore granted considerable 
independence.19 History compilation offices were established on an ad hoc 
and temporary basis after the death of a monarch, and were largely 
composed of prominent scholar-officials.20 They generally consisted of 
about thirty officers, including a chairman, three high-ranking officers 
who were each assigned responsibility for a particular period of the 
decedent monarch’s reign, and six compilers.21 In addition, several clerks 
                                                
15 Id. at 161. As described in the Koryosa (a fifteenth century Korean dynastic 
history), “[w]e recorded the loyal and deceitful officials as well as the evil and the upright 
individuals under separate categories . . . only by exhibiting the illustrious mirror of 
history can we ensure that the consequences of good and evil acts shall not be forgotten 
by posterity.” Chong Inji, Dedication to Koryosa 1a-4b, in SOURCEBOOK OF KOREAN 
CIVILIZATION, VOLUME I: FROM EARLY TIMES TO THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 531, 533 
(Peter H. Lee, et. al. eds., 1993).  
16 James Palais, Records and Record-Keeping in Nineteenth Century Korea, 30 
J. ASIAN STUD. 583, 584 (1971). The historians had “the right, if not duty, to indicate by a 
gratuitous assessment of praise and blame just who were the ‘good guys’—the really 
morally right ones—and who were not.” Id. 
17 Id.  
18 As one historian put it, “traditional history was not very analytical. When it 
tried to analyze an historical event, it tended to do so by judging the behaviour of the 
actors involved according to traditional Confucian moral categories rather than looking at 
impersonal social or economic forces.” Don Baker, Histories and Counter-histories, 
Writing the History of the Korean People in the Past, the Present, and the Future, 
KEYNOTE ADDRESS AT THE INAUGURAL MEETING OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR 
KOREAN HISTORICAL STUDIES 1 (June 2009) (on file with author). 
19  SOHN POKEE, SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE EARLY CHOSON DYNASTY: THE 
FUNCTIONAL ASPECTS OF GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE 175-77 (2000). 
20 Palais, supra note 16, at 586; Eunha Youn, Archival Traditions in Korean 
History: From Medieval Practices to the Contemporary Public Records Management Act, 
13 ARCHIVAL SCIENCE 23, 27 (2013).  
21 GEORGE MCCUNE, THE YI DYNASTY ANNALS OF KOREA 66 (1940). 
32 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal Vol. 14:3 
decided which sources would be included in the annals.22 The compilers 
were members of the aristocratic class (yangban), who could function at 
times as a check on royal despotism.23 In part because of the independence 
of the drafters and compilers, the silloks were given great status as official 
histories.24 The documents themselves were treated with utmost respect, 
with copies carefully maintained in four separate mountain archives, in 
addition to archives located in Seoul.25 
The ad hoc sillok compilation offices were not modern 
investigatory commissions, and did not focus on human rights violations. 
Rather, they compiled full, ostensibly objective histories of the previous 
monarch’s reign.26 However, in reflecting on the actions of past regimes, 
modern truth commissions seek to address many of the same societal 
needs fulfilled by traditional Korean silloks. These needs include nation 
building, distribution of honor to those worthy of it, and provision of 
moral lessons, albeit with the comparatively modern moral concept of 
human rights rather than that of Confucianism.27 They also share the same 
basic bureaucratic structure: a theoretically independent ad hoc and 
temporary group of governmentally appointed officials.28 In any event, 
while official history writing has maintained a presence in modern Korea, 
the tradition of silloks came to an unceremonious end during the period of 
Japanese colonization from 1910 to 1945. 29  During that period, the 
Japanese colonial government established its own history compilation 
                                                
22 Id. 
23 Oh, supra note 13, at 163-64. 
24 Yongho Ch’oe, Compilation of History, in SOURCES OF KOREAN TRADITION, 
301 (Peter Lee & Theodore de Bary eds. 1997) (“[f]ew states in world history, it may be 
said, were as conscious of history as the Choson dynasty.”).  
25 Id. at 302.  
26 Pokee, supra note 19, at 175-77. 
27  See generally Wiebelhaus-Brahm, supra note 1; Greg Grandin, The 
Instruction of Great Catastrophe: Truth Commissions, National History, and State 
Formation in Argentina, Chile, and Guatemala, 110 AMER. HIST. R. 46 (2006).  
28 Compare Youn, supra note 20, at 27 (noting temporary nature of sillok 
committees), and Pokee, supra note 19, at 175-77 (describing independence of sillok 
committees), with PRISCILLA HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: CONFRONTING STATE 
TERROR AND ATROCITY 14 (2001). 
29 KANG JAE-EUN, THE LAND OF SCHOLARS: TWO THOUSAND YEARS OF KOREAN 
CONFUCIANISM 218 (2003).  
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committee to write silloks for emperors Gojong and Sunjong.30  The 
resulting histories were rejected by Koreans as biased and inaccurate. 31  
A. 1945-1987: Authoritarianism and Failed Commissions  
With the end of the Japanese occupation in 1945, Korea entered 
into a period of intra-peninsular conflict and authoritarian rule until the 
democratic election of Roh Tae Woo in 1987.32 During this period, there 
was a strong sentiment among large segments of the public to officially 
investigate past abuses.33  However, on the only two occasions when 
official commissions were established, conservative political forces 
quickly thwarted the truth-seeking efforts.34 
The first of these occasions took place very shortly after Korea 
regained its independence in 1948, after a period of U.S. military rule. One 
of the first actions of the new National Assembly of Korea was its 
establishment of the Special Committee to Investigate Anti-Nation 
Activities.35 This body was formed to address the issue of the existence of 
pro-Japanese collaborators during the Japanese colonial era.36 However, 
Syngman Rhee and his allies undermined the Committee from the start, 
deriving political support from former collaborators.37 The Committee was 
moribund within a year, accomplishing very little.38 
                                                
30 Id. Gojong and Sunjong were the final two Joseon dynasty monarchs prior to 
Korea’s annexation by Japan. Their silloks were compiled by the Office of the Yi Royal 
Family, under the direction of the Japanese Government-General, and completed in 1935. 
Id.  
31 Yu Seokjae, Gojong/Sunjong Sillogui “Jjimjjimhan” Inteonet Gonggae, [The 
“Uncomfortable” Internet Release of Gojong Sillok and Sunjong Sillok], CHOSUN ILBO, 
Jan. 14, 2007, available at 
http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2007/01/14/2007011400715.html. 
32 Gentilucci, supra note 4, at 88, n. 37. 
33  Chung Youn-Tae, Refracted Modernity and the Issue of Pro-Japanese 
Collaborators in Korea, 42 KOREA J. 18, 35 (2002), available at 
http://www.ekoreajournal.net/issue/view_pop.htm?Idx=3215. 
34 Id. at 35-37; Jung Byung-joon, Attempts to Settle the Past during the April 
Popular Struggle, 42 KOREA J. 88, 104 (2002), available at 
http://www.ekoreajournal.net/issue/view_pop.htm?Idx=3213. 
35  Banminjok haengwi cheobeol beop [The Act for Punishing Anti-Nation 
Activities], Statutes of S. Korea, Law No. 3 of 1948 (abolished by Law No. 176 of 1951). 
 
36  Chung Youn-Tae, Refracted Modernity and the Issue of Pro-Japanese 
Collaborators in Korea, 42 KOREA J. 18, 35 (2002), available at 
http://www.ekoreajournal.net/issue/view_pop.htm?Idx=3215. 
37 Id. at 35-37. The first President of Korea, Rhee remains a divisive figure 
within Korea. Some applaud him as a patriot and independence activist who played the 
leading role in establishing an independent Korea, while others condemn him as a power-
hungry dictator who brooked no dissent. Lee Sang-Hoon, Syngman Rhee’s Vision and 
Reality: The Establishment of the Nation and Thereafter, 14(3) REV. OF KOREAN STUD. 
34 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal Vol. 14:3 
Official truth-seeking took a back seat over the next twelve years, 
primarily due to the Korean War and Syngman Rhee’s increasingly 
authoritarian regime. When the Rhee regime was overthrown in the April 
Student Revolution of 1960, there was a brief period of hope that 
democracy could emerge.39 Soon thereafter, the survivors of the Geochang 
massacre and other massacres orchestrated during the Korean War era 
initiated public disclosures of numerous killings by the Rhee regime, 
which had previously not been officially acknowledged.40 This led to the 
establishment of the Special Committee on the Fact-Finding of Massacres 
by the National Assembly in May 1960.41 However, the committee’s 
investigation lasted only eleven days, and amounted to three brief 
investigative tours to Gyeongsang and Jeolla provinces, where some of the 
worst massacres had taken place. 42 In the highly polarized atmosphere of 
the time, conservative opposition prevented any serious examination of 
Rhee era abuses.43  
The following year, Park Chung Hee took power in a bloodless 
coup, ruling until his own director of intelligence assassinated him in 
1979.44 Despite his assassination, democracy and truth seeking activities 
were delayed again. The following year, General Chun Doo Hwan 
subsequently seized control, brutally massacring hundreds of protesters 
against his rule in the city of Gwangju.45 It was not until 1987 that Korea’s 
                                                                                                                     
33, 55 (2011). 
38 Kim Cheong-Won, Pro-Japan Collaborators List Sparks Controversy, KOREA 
TIMES, Aug. 29, 2005, available at 
http://www.international.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=29195. The Commission 
investigated 682 cases, and recommended that 559 of them be transferred to a special 
prosecutor's office, which handed down indictments in 221 cases. Thirty-eight cases were 
eventually tried, resulting in twelve guilty verdicts. Id. 
39 Kim Il-Young, The Race Against Time: Disintegration of the Chang Myun 
Government and Aborted Democracy, 7(3) REV. OF KOREAN STUD. 167, 167 (2004). 
40 Kim Dong-Choon, Beneath the Tip of the Iceberg: Problems in Historical 
Clarification of the Korean War, 42 KOREA J. 60, 72 (2002), available at 
http://www.ekoreajournal.net/issue/view_pop.htm?Idx=3214. 
41 Kim Dong-Choon, The Long Road Toward Truth and Reconciliation, 42 
CRITICAL ASIAN STUD. 525, 532 (2010).  
42  Jung Byung-joon, Attempts to Settle the Past During the April Popular 
Struggle, 42 KOREA J. 88, 104 (2002), available at 
http://www.ekoreajournal.net/issue/view_pop.htm?Idx=3213. 
43 Id. 
44 James M. West, Martial Lawlessness: The Legal Aftermath of Kwangju, 6 
PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 85, 90 (1997). 
45 Id. at 92-96. 
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first free election was held in the wake of massive pro-democracy 
protests.46  
B.  1987-2003: Democratic Transition and the First Truth 
Commissions 
Former military general Roh Tae Woo, who was Chun Doo Hwan’s 
close confidant and chosen successor, was victorious in the 1987 
presidential election, largely because three leaders of the movement for 
democracy split the opposition vote.47 Almost immediately upon Roh Tae 
Woo’s election, attention turned to addressing the past, with a focus on 
victims of the Gwangju massacre of 1980.48 The massacre is considered 
the largest incident of state violence in the post-Korean War era.49 Starting 
in June 1988, the National Assembly held hearings on the issue, with 
sixty-seven witnesses, including former President Chun, who apologized 
for his past actions and entered a Buddhist retreat. 50  The National 
Assembly also passed a controversial law providing compensation for 
victims of the Gwangju massacre,51 and eventually 2224 victims, which 
included those injured and families of the dead and missing, received a 
total of 142.8 billion won.52 
After Kim Young Sam’s election in 1992, the focus turned to 
institutional reforms, especially the removal or reassignment of military 
leaders closely linked to the deposed authoritarian regime.53 There were 
also renewed calls for transitional justice for the military leaders who had 
been instrumental in maintaining power and suppressing dissent during the 
Chun regime.54  Following the disclosure of allegations of large-scale 
                                                
46 See Han Sung-Joo, South Korea in 1987: The Politics of Democratization, 
28(1) ASIAN SURVEY 52, 52-57 (1988). 
47 Id. at 57. 
48 Young Jo Lee, supra note 5, at 7. 
49  Cho Hee-Yeon, Sacrifices Caused by State Violence Under Military 
Authoritarianism and the Dynamics of Settling the Past during the Democratic 
Transition, 42 KOREA J. 163, 174 (2002), available at 
http://www.ekoreajournal.net/issue/view_pop.htm?Idx=3210. 
50 Young Jo Lee, supra note 5, at 7. 
51  Gwangju Minjuhwa Undong Gwanryeonja Bosang Deungye Gwanhan 
Beobyul [Act for Compensation for the Victims in the Democratization Movement in 
Kwangju], Act No. 4266, Aug. 6, 1990 (S. Kor.).  
52 Ahn Jong-cheol, The Significance of Settling the Past of the December 12 
Coup and the May 18 Gwangju Uprising, 42 KOREA J. 112, 127 (2002), available at 
http://www.ekoreajournal.net/issue/view_pop.htm?Idx=3212. 
53 Young Jo Lee, supra note 5, at 9. 
54 Kuk Cho, Transitional Justice in Korea: Legally Coping with Past Wrongs 
After Democratization, 16 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 579, 581 (2007), available at 
https://digital.lib.washington.edu/dspace-law/handle/1773.1/582. 
36 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal Vol. 14:3 
corruption against Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo, these calls were 
even stronger.55 This led to Chun and Roh’s 1997 trial and conviction, 
along with six other military leaders, for military insubordination, 
subversion of the constitutional order, and corruption.56 However, their 
conviction was largely symbolic, as all parties were pardoned and released 
from prison relatively soon afterward.57 Other trials of individuals for 
human rights abuses in the authoritarian era have been prevented due to 
the expiration of the statutes of limitations. 58  Since that time, truth 
commissions have been the instrument of choice for dealing with the past, 
and, unlike the 1948 Special Committee to Investigate Anti-Nation 
Activities, these commissions have existed in a separate sphere from the 
criminal justice system.59 While some have recommended pardons or the 
retrial of individuals who were illegitimately prosecuted during the 
authoritarian era, none have been able to initiate prosecutions.60  
The first post-1987 truth commission was established during the 
Kim Young Sam administration to investigate the Geochang massacre, 
where the Korean army slaughtered several hundred unarmed civilians in 
South Gyeongsang Province.61 In many ways this set the precedent for 
future Korean truth commissions dealing with the Korean War period, 
which were relatively small, independent, incident-specific bodies with 
limited coercive power.62  
After Kim Dae Jung’s election in 1997, public pressure for truth 
commissions to investigate past misconduct intensified, and in the wake of 
high-profile public protests, three important new commissions were 
established.63 The Commission for Restoring Honor and Compensation for 
Victims of Democratization Movements was tasked with deciding whether 
applicants were involved with the democratization movement and, if so, to 
make recommendations regarding their treatment. 64  These 
                                                
55 Id. at 582. 
56 Young Jo Lee, supra note 5, at 10. 
57 Kuk Cho, supra note 54, at 585. 
58 Id. at 585-87. 
59 See generally Young Jo Lee, supra note 5. 
60 See Kim Dong-Choon, supra note 41, at 548. 
61  Geochang Sageondeung Gwanryeonjaeui Myungye Hoebokye Gwanhan 
Teukbyeol Jochibeob [Act for Restoring Honor for Victims of Geochang and Other 
Massacres], Act. No. 5148, Jan. 5, 1996 (S. Kor.). 
62 See generally Young Jo Lee, supra note 5. 
63 Id. at 18; Kuk Cho, supra note 54, at 597. 
64 Minjuhwa Undong Gwanryeonja Myungye Hoebok Mit Bosang Deungye 
Gwanhan Beobyul [Act for Restoring Honor and Compensation for Victims in 
Connection with Democratization Movements], Act. No. 6123, Jan. 12, 2000 (S. Kor.). 
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recommendations could request that victims be provided with 
compensation, pardoned for a related conviction, rehired if fired in 
connection with the democratization movement, or that schools expunge 
disciplinary records and bestow honorary graduation diplomas.65  The 
Commission made a number of controversial decisions during its 
operation. Among them, the declaration that members of the radical left-
wing National Liberation Front of South Korea be honored as 
“democratization movement participants,” as should a group of Dong-Eui 
University students involved in a anti-corruption protest where Molotov 
cocktails were thrown by students, causing a fire.66 The fire caused the 
deaths of seven police officers. 67  
The Truth Commission on Suspicious Deaths was also set up to 
investigate suspicious deaths that occurred during the authoritarian era.68 It 
consisted of nine commissioners appointed by the President, and was 
limited to deaths related to the democratization movement since August 7, 
1969.69 Suspicious deaths were defined as “deaths that occurred with 
relation to the democratization movement whose cause has not been 
identified and which shows probable cause that it might have resulted 
from direct or indirect illegal exercise of state authority.” 70  This 
commission received eighty petitions alleging suspicious deaths, and 
confirmed that in nineteen of these cases, the deaths had been a result of 
the unlawful exercise of state power during the democratization 
movement, while an additional thirty cases were unverifiable.71 However, 
the commission’s inability to subpoena documents or compel testimony 
led to doubts as to whether it had been able to comprehensively examine 
the facts in all cases.72  
The third commission initiated under the Kim Dae Jung 
government was the Commission for Truth-Seeking and Honor 
Restoration for Victims of the Cheju April 3rd Events.73 This commission 
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was established after successful petitioning by well-organized civil 
groups, such as the Pan-National Committee for Probing the Truth of the 
Cheju April 3rd Events and Retrieving the Honor of the Victims.74 The 
Cheju April 3rd events refer to a series of leftist uprisings and brutal 
counterinsurgency actions undertaken between 1948 and 1954 on Cheju 
Island, which caused an estimated fifteen to thirty thousand deaths.75 The 
Commission was made up of three parts: the 4.3 Committee, the 4.3 
Working Committee, and the Report Task Force. The Committee was the 
investigative and deliberative body, while the Working Committee carried 
out practical work, such as accepting victim petitions, conducting an initial 
screening of victims, and administering financial and medical subsidies. 76 
The Report Task Force was in charge of publishing the final report, which 
was issued in October 2003.77 In April 2006, President Roh officially 
apologized for the South Korean government’s role in the massacres.78  
C. 2003-2008: Roh Moo Hyun and a Full Embrace of Truth 
Commissions  
The Roh Moo Hyun administration (2003-2008) witnessed the full 
entrenchment of truth commissions on the Korean political scene, with the 
legislative establishment of several new commissions along with 
continued support for existing ones. The new commissions from this 
period can be divided into three categories: (1) the commissions that dealt 
with issues stemming from the Japanese annexation and earlier; (2) the 
largely issue-specific commissions that dealt with human rights violations 
from the post-1945 era of authoritarianism; and (3) the TRCK, which was 
established as a larger and more comprehensive commission that dealt 
with issues from both the Japanese colonial and authoritarian eras.  
The Korean political scene was quite polarized during the Roh era, 
and the debates regarding truth commissions invariably reflected these 
divisions. Many political conservatives had direct or indirect connections 
to the authoritarian era and, according to some, collaborators from the 
Japanese colonial era.79 Most notably, Park Geun Hye, daughter of Park 
Chung Hee, was the conservative Grand National Party chairperson from 
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2004 to 2006. 80  On the other side of the political spectrum, many 
progressive leaders, including President Roh himself, had been involved in 
the democratization movement and were closely identified with it.81 Thus, 
while there is no debating the sincere desires of activists to address past 
human rights abuses, many Koreans suspected that progressive politicians 
were using truth commissions as a partisan tool to embarrass their political 
rivals by highlighting the crimes of their political (or actual) ancestors.82 
As one commentator noted, “[r]ectifying past wrongs became an important 
agenda item of the progressive government in order for it to consolidate its 
support while weakening the moral basis of the conservatives.”83  
1. Commissions Dealing with the Japanese Colonial Era and Earlier 
For the first time since the abortive 1948 efforts, the Roh 
administration organized official commissions to examine Korea under 
Japanese imperialism. These included the Commission on Truths of Anti-
Nation Activities and Pro-Japanese Acts under Japanese Rule, 84  the 
Commission on Confiscation of Properties of Pro-Japanese 
Collaborators, 85  the Commission for Identifying Truth Regarding 
Servitude under Japanese Colonial Occupation,86 and the Commission on 
Restitution of Donghak Peasant Revolutionaries. 87  The decision to 
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examine the Japanese colonial period provoked intense debate.88  For 
progressives, the failure of Korean society to punish pro-Japanese 
collaborators and eliminate them from positions of power constituted one 
of the primary flaws in the founding of the Korean republic, leading 
directly to the imposition of an authoritarian state.89 Conservatives, on the 
other hand, generally felt that it was better to move beyond past divisions, 
and argued that blame would unfairly fall upon the descendants of those 
condemned for collaborating.90 
These truth commissions had three main functions. First, the 
Commission on Confiscation of Properties of Pro-Japanese Collaborators 
was established to identify and confiscate real property that was gained 
through pro-Japanese actions during the colonial era. 91 This commission 
emerged from public outcry as a result of a set of court decisions awarding 
the descendants of collaborators ownership of valuable property that had 
been granted to their ancestors in exchange for cooperation with the 
Japanese regime.92 At the time of its closure in 2010, the commission had 
seized 237 billion won worth of property from 168 individuals who had 
either inherited the properties or purchased them after the passage of a 
special law on the reversion of collaborators’ properties. 93  The 
commission’s work was challenged in the courts as unconstitutional, but 
the Constitutional Court upheld the seizures in a recent decision.94 
Second, the Commission on Truths of Damages of Japanese-forced 
Emigration and the Commission for Identifying Truth Regarding Servitude 
under Japanese Colonial Occupation functioned as investigative bodies to 
deal with unresolved issues from the colonial era.95 The Commission for 
Identifying Truth Regarding Servitude under Japanese Colonial 
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Occupation was of particular importance. The eighty-five person body 
received over 200,000 applications for forced labor certification and 
investigated numerous sites in Japan containing cremated Korean 
remains.96 One particularly controversial decision from this commission 
was its conclusion that eighty-three Koreans in the Japanese military, who 
had been convicted after the war as Class B and C war criminals for 
mistreating prisoners of war, should have their honor restored as “double 
victims” of both the Japanese imperialists and the allied war crimes 
tribunals.97 
Third, the remaining commissions focused on the identification of 
individuals from the period deserving of honor or condemnation for their 
patriotic or collaborationist behavior during the period. While few of the 
individuals investigated were still alive, the importance of familial 
reputation in a traditionally Confucian society such as Korea meant that 
these commissions’ work remained vitally important to current affairs.98 
Conservatives vigorously opposed such projects, because some prominent 
political and civil society leaders were descended from alleged 
collaborators.99 However, it turned out that some prominent leaders from 
the left were also related to collaborators, leading to the resignations of 
several politicians.100  
2. Commissions dealing with the Authoritarian Era 
During the Roh regime, there were four commissions set up 
legislatively to address human rights abuses during the authoritarian era: 
(1) the Commission on Restitution and Compensation for Samcheong 
Reeducation Camp Detainees,101 (2) the Commission on Identification and 
Restitution of No Gun Ri Victims,102 (3) the Presidential Commission on 
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Suspicious Deaths in the Military,103 and (4) the Commission on Truths of 
and Livelihood Support for Victimized Hansen Patients.104 In addition, it 
is worth mentioning the Commission on Compensation for Special 
Operations Agents, which differed from the other commissions in that it 
rewarded individuals who served the authoritarian government rather than 
those who fought against it or were victimized by it.105  
Aside from these legislatively mandated truth commissions, it is 
worth noting that the Roh administration established a number of 
commissions within particular government agencies to bring to light 
possible human rights abuses by those agencies during the authoritarian 
era.106 In part, these commissions were a reaction to the need to produce 
considerable amounts of information for the statutory commissions 
discussed earlier. The first of these agency commissions was the 
Committee for Development through Identifying the Truth of Past 
Incidents of the National Intelligence Service, which was established in 
November 2004 to examine the role of the National Intelligence Service 
(formerly, the Korean Central Intelligence Agency) in wrongdoing during 
the authoritarian period. 107  The Committee was composed of fifteen 
members, including ten civilians, and ended up investigating seven well-
known cases from the authoritarian period, including the kidnapping of 
opposition leader and future president Kim Dae Jung and the explosion on 
Korea Airlines flight 858.108 Soon afterward, the National Police Bureau 
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and Ministry of Defense followed suit with their own truth commissions, 
each of which was called the Committee to Identify the Truth Regarding 
Past Incidents.109 The Police Committee investigated police involvement 
in massacres, rigged elections, illegal surveillance and fabrication of 
evidence during the authoritarian period. 110 The Defense Ministry 
Committee examined cases of forced conscription, military agent training, 
and a training camp for civilians, among others, eventually recommending 
that the government issue an apology for its wrongdoing.111  
III. TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF KOREA 
The TRCK needs to be discussed in more detail, as it was the most 
comprehensive and far-reaching of the Korean truth commission efforts, 
with a relatively large budget and staff.112 It was established on July 31, 
2005, pursuant to the Framework Act on Clearing up Past Incidents for 
Truth and Reconciliation, with a stated purpose to “foster national 
legitimacy and reconcile the past for the sake of national unity by 
honoring those who participated in the anti-Japanese movements and 
investigating incidents regarding human rights abuses, violence, and 
massacres occurring from the period of Japanese rule to the present time; 
specifically during the nation’s authoritarian regimes.”113 According to one 
Commissioner, it was modeled on and named after the South African 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission,114 and TRCK reports highlighted 
the influence of recent international experiences in truth-seeking. 115 
However, in practice there were many obvious differences in the work of 
the TRCK and the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 
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This article shows that the TRCK can just as easily be contextualized as 
part of a long line of Korean experiences searching for the truth about past 
regimes.116 
A. Mandate 
One of the most controversial elements of the TRCK was the scope 
of its mandate. Progressives wanted to focus on human rights abuses 
during the authoritarian era and civilian massacres committed by the South 
Korean government and U.S. army during the period from 1945 to the end 
of the Korean War in July 1953.117 Conservative parliamentarians, on the 
other hand, thought this would be a one-sided approach, and as a condition 
for their support insisted that the TRCK also look at massacres by 
communist or North Korean forces during the Korean War.118 In addition, 
some conservatives insisted that the TRCK look at certain positive aspects 
of Korea’s past, such as the contributions of overseas Koreans to Korea’s 
national prestige.119 After much debate, the final legislation covered five 
substantive areas:  
(1) Anti-Japanese movements during Japanese rule, as well 
as in the years following Korea’s liberation;  
(2) Efforts by overseas Koreans to uphold Korea’s 
sovereignty and enhance Korea’s national prestige from the 
time of the Japanese occupation to the enforcement date of 
the Act;  
(3) massacres from 15 August 1945 to the Korean War 
period;  
(4) incidents of death, injury, or disappearance, and other 
major acts of human rights violations, including politically 
fabricated trials that were committed through the illegal or 
seriously unjust exercise of state power, such as the 
violation of the constitutional order from 15 August 1945 to 
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the end of the authoritarian regimes;  
(5) terrorist acts, human rights violations, violence, 
massacres, and suspicious deaths by parties that denied the 
legitimacy of or were hostile toward the Republic of Korea 
from 15 August 1945 to the end of the authoritarian 
regimes; and  
(6) incidents that are historically important and incidents 
that the Commission deems necessary.120  
However, the legislation did not entirely resolve the question of the 
scope of the TRCK’s mandate. It defined the end point of its mandate 
under subsections (3) and (4) as “the end of the authoritarian regimes,” but 
there was no consensus as to the exact date when the authoritarian regimes 
ended.121 According to former Standing Commissioner Kim Dong Choon, 
the Commission’s mandate ended in 1992,122 when Kim Young Sam 
became the first person elected to the Presidency without a background in 
the military.123 Others pointed to the end of Chun Doo Hwan’s rule in 
1988, or Kim Dae Jung’s ascension to the Presidency in 1998 as the real 
end of the authoritarian era.124 In the end, the Commission settled upon the 
end of Chun Doo Hwan’s rule in February 1988 as an end date, with the 
caveat that historically important incidents after that time could be 
investigated pursuant to subsection (6) of the TRCK mandate.125  
B. Composition 
The TRCK was comprised of fifteen Commissioners, including 
four Standing Commissioners, who were appointed as public officers.126 
Each Commissioner served for a two-year term, with the possibility of 
reappointment for a second term.127 Of the fifteen Commissioners, the 
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President appointed eight, four were nominated by the President, and three 
were nominated by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.128 Although 
most Commissioners have been lawyers, a number of historians, religious 
leaders, and civil leaders have also served.129  
The Commissioners were at all times divided by political 
orientation, and the relationship between left-wing and right-wing 
Commissioners was generally contentious.130 Decisions were taken by 
majority vote, rather than consensus.131 The first Commission President 
was Father Song Ki In, a Catholic priest who had been closely associated 
with then-President Roh since the democratization era, and has been called 
Roh’s “spiritual advisor.”132 The second was Ahn Byung Ook, a Korean 
history professor and former Commissioner of the Commission on Truths 
of Suspicious Deaths.133 Ahn’s term expired in November 2009, and from 
then on, President Lee Myung Bak’s appointees dominated the 
Commission.134  
C. Functions and Powers 
The TRCK was essentially an investigatory body, responsive to 
petitions submitted by the general public. Investigations often included 
site visits as well as archival research and questioning of pertinent 
authorities.135 In cases of alleged massacres, decisions were based on what 
it called the “two source policy,” by which two independent and 
supporting witness opinions were required in order to verify that an 
innocent death had occurred.136  
The Commission had relatively weak powers to compel 
cooperation. It was able to request that documents be turned over from 
State authorities, but such requests could be denied if the relevant 
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authority claimed that the documents contained materials sensitive to 
national security.137  
D. Findings 
The TRCK ended its investigations on July 31, 2010, five years 
after its establishment, and issued its final report on December 31, 2010. 
In all, the Commission investigated 11,175 claims submitted by the public, 
of which 8,468 claims (75 percent) were verified, 1,725 claims (15 
percent) were dismissed, and 510 claims (4.5 percent) were unverified.138  
Public attention focused largely on the claims involving civilian 
massacres and human rights abuses. There were six particular types of 
massacre claims examined: (1) mass killings after preventive detention of 
alleged “impure elements;” (2) the Bodo League Incidents; 139  (3) 
retaliation against alleged collaborators; (4) civilian killings during the 
search for communist guerillas; (5) civilian deaths resulting from U.S. 
bombings; and (6) summary executions during suppression of the Yeosu-
Suncheon uprising.140 As for human rights abuses during the authoritarian 
era, the TRCK examined cases involving the illegal or unfair exercise of 
state power; serious infringements of human rights such as death, serious 
injury or disappearance and instances of unjust court verdicts, often 
regarding violation of the National Security Law.141  
Although critics claimed that the Commission’s findings were 
nothing new, there is no doubt that the Commission’s work brought 
additional attention to some of the more sensitive elements of Korea’s 
modern history.142 For example, the role of U.S. forces in enabling or 
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committing human rights abuses was highlighted in ways that had not 
previously been well known outside of Korea.143 More fundamentally, the 
acknowledgement of truths by an authoritative commission functioned to 
officially validate truths that, even when widely known, had been denied 
by the Korean state for decades.144  
E. Recommendations 
The TRCK issued recommendations, both on an interim basis, and 
also as part of the final report. In massacre cases, the recommendations 
focused on providing State apologies, revising family registries, instituting 
memorial events, revising historical records, peace and human rights 
education, law revisions, and medical subsidies for the wounded.145 In 
human rights abuse cases, the TRCK recommended retrials, state 
apologies, deletion of records, and the provision of compensation and 
medical services for victims and bereaved families.146 Although the TRCK 
does not have the power to award compensation, it has recommended that 
the government pass a law awarding compensation to victims. 147  In 
addition, several plaintiffs have won compensation from the courts based 
on TRCK findings.148 
Government officials have not always followed the TRCK’s 
recommendations, however. It is true that Former President Roh Moo 
Hyun apologized for the State’s role in the Ulsan Bodo League 
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Massacre.149 However, the Lee Myung Bak administration has yet to issue 
any official apologies, and very few local officials have either.150  
IV. TRUTH COMMISSIONS UNDER LEE MYUNG BAK (2008-2011) 
In 2007, Lee Myung Bak was elected president, bringing a more 
conservative administration to Seoul. 151  The Lee Myung Bak 
administration chose not to renew the mandate of the TRCK, although it 
was given an additional eight months to complete its final report, which 
was issued in December 2010. 152  However, because TRCK 
Commissioners have a two-year tenure, the new administration was able 
to put its imprint on the work of the Commission by appointing 
conservative Commissioners who controlled the commission’s work 
during its final year. 153  This sudden switch in orientation led to 
controversy almost immediately when a newly conservative TRCK chose 
not to issue an official English-language report printed a few months 
earlier by the previous progressive administration, and was seen as going 
too far in its personal criticism of Park Chung Hee.154 There was also 
controversy regarding some of the Commission’s conclusions during its 
final months, especially its recommendation that Korea seek compensation 
from the United States for only eight specific incidents, which were 
identified as atrocities, committed by the United States forces during the 
Korean War.155 The Commission investigated 138 instances of atrocities, 
but according to the Commission’s then-President Lee Joung Yo—a 
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conservative appointee—the other 130 cases were “more like cases of 
negligence than of liability for war crimes.”156  
Nevertheless, the Lee Myung Bak administration has not totally 
abandoned the truth commission concept. In 2008, it set up the Committee 
for 10.27 Buddhist Persecution Honor-Restoration to restore honor to the 
victims of a violent attack on Buddhists that took place in October 
1980.157 During this attack, Korea’s Joint Investigation Corps arrested 153 
Buddhists and mobilized 32,000 military and police troopers to search 
5,731 temples across the country, with victims alleging that they were 
beaten and tortured.158 The current administration has also initiated a new 
commission to address forced emigration during Japanese rule,159 and 
established the Committee for Truth of Abduction during the Korean War 
to investigate the abduction of South Koreans by North Koreans during 
the Korean War, and to restore the honor of the victims.160 The retreating 
North Korean People’s Army allegedly abducted almost 100,000 South 
Koreans during the war, but to date there has been little official attention 
to their fates, due to the difficulty in distinguishing between voluntary 
defectors and abductees.161  
V. CHARACTERISTICS OF KOREAN TRUTH COMMISSIONS  
Given the many experiences of truth commissions in Korea to date, 
it is worth briefly addressing the question of what might be considered the 
particularities of the Korean use of truth commissions. It is a question that 
is deserving of more in-depth research, but this section will broach the 
subject by suggesting a few characteristics of the use of truth commissions 
in Korea; namely, that they address a particularly broad and 
comprehensive range of topics, deal with events in the relatively distant 
past, are generally victim-centered, and have focused on uncovering 
historical facts rather than providing deeper inquiries into historical 
question of causation and consequences.  
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Perhaps the most evident feature of the Korean use of truth 
commissions is the extraordinarily wide and comprehensive range of 
issues that have been addressed with a truth commission model, 
encompassing various types of human rights abuses, collaborationist 
activities, and massacres from the turn of the twentieth century until the 
democratic transition of 1987.162 On occasion, truth commissions even 
investigated positive elements of the past, one example being the TRCK’s 
findings on the contributions of overseas Koreans to Korea’s national 
prestige, which included reports lauding the positive contributions of 
taekwondo and Korean miners and nurses in Germany.163 Clearly, the 
Korean political establishment has deployed truth commissions or their 
very close kin particularly liberally. Although a full examination of why 
this might be is beyond the scope of this article, there are certain cultural 
explanations that likely help explain their popularity. Truth commissions 
fill an important role in attaining some form of restorative justice in a 
traditionally non-litigious society, and have particular resonance in a 
country where Confucian norms ensure the continuing relevance of 
individuals’ reputations, even many years after their death. 164  Truth 
commissions also tap into a centuries-long tradition of Korean official 
historiography, which has customarily produced comprehensive histories 
as part of political transitions.  
Another notable feature of Korean truth commissions is that they 
have tended to address issues from the relatively distant past. All of the 
post-1996 Korean truth commissions addressed events from before 1988, 
and some, such as the Commission on Restitution of Donghak Peasant 
Revolutionaries, investigated events from up to a century earlier.165 This is 
exceptional when compared to the work of truth commissions elsewhere in 
the world. According to a recent survey of twenty nine truth commissions, 
only Uruguay’s Commission for Peace (2000-2002), the Panama Truth 
Commission (2001-2002), and the TRCK were mandated to investigate 
incidents that ended over five years before the commission’s 
establishment. 166  The Korean experience also runs counter to the 
conventional wisdom that truth commissions should be established soon 
after a political transition. 167  The continuing study of Korean truth 
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commissions may thus be useful in ongoing debates in Brazil, Spain, 
Taiwan and elsewhere over the appropriate time to initiate a truth 
commission, and whether in fact it is ever too late to address past human 
rights abuses. 
Korean truth commissions can, with a few exceptions, also be 
characterized as essentially victim-centered. They have rarely punished or 
recommended punishment for offenders.168 In fact, in most cases Korean 
truth commissions have refrained from publicizing the names of 
perpetrators. 169  Nor have they been greatly involved in making 
recommendations for institutional reforms. Rather, the focus has been on 
the victims, and especially on revealing the truth surrounding their 
victimization and rehabilitating their reputations, phrased as “restoring 
their honor” in the preferred formulation.170 While the Korean post-1987 
transition has been criticized for its lack of attention to the perpetrators of 
political violence, the focus on victims does respond to very real needs. 171 
Entire families of individuals persecuted or massacred because of alleged 
leftist sympathies suffered from discrimination and social stigma during 
the authoritarian era and into the nineties, because of their alleged links to 
communism.172 Official rehabilitation of their reputations was intended to 
bring them relief and help them regain their sense of honor.173 The focus 
on victims also tacitly acknowledges the political difficulty of assigning 
individual guilt given the significant public support for Korea’s 
authoritarian regimes and lingering admiration for their economic 
successes.174 
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Finally, Korean truth commissions have tended to focus on 
uncovering the historical facts behind a particular incident or set of 
incidents, without truly engaging in the task of interpreting those incidents 
to provide a broader narrative that addresses questions of causation and 
consequences. For example, according to its former President, the TRCK 
focused on “determining whether or not the petitioner’s claim actually 
occurred, and cannot look into the structure of how the victimization 
occurred or the cause and background into why it happened.”175 This 
tendency, which was criticized by foreign observers,176 runs counter to the 
advice of many transitional justice scholars, who argue that truth 
commissions should be fundamentally concerned with understanding the 
causes and consequences of human rights abuses, and not just whether or 
not they occurred.177 This straightforward setting forth of purportedly 
objective fact has strong roots in traditional Korean history writing, which 
was “more concerned with relating what happened than with trying to 
explain why it happened or to put what happened into a longer 
narrative.”178 This relatively non-analytic style is also likely a product of 
the fundamental lack of consensus in Korean society on the structural 
causes and consequences of past abuses and massacres, even when there is 
widespread acceptance that such abuses and massacres in fact occurred 
and should be condemned. 179  
VI. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS IN KOREA 
As the Lee Myung Bak administration comes to a close and Park 
Geun Hye ascends to the presidency, it is unclear what the future may hold 
for truth commissions in Korea. During her campaign, Park stressed the 
idea of unity and reconciliation between past adversaries, most 
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prominently by visiting the graves of important democracy advocates.180 
This was in part a way to overcome her association by some voters with 
her father’s anti-democratic policies and rights abuses.181 However, some 
progressives have dismissed Park’s efforts at reconciliation as premature 
before the truth had been determined.182 While Park has discussed forming 
a commission to deal with reconciliation issues, especially those that took 
place during her father’s presidency, it is as yet unclear what the mandate 
of such a body would consist of.183 In fact, the progressive former head of 
the TRCK has already shed doubt upon such plans, stating that Park’s real 
goal is the exoneration of her father’s name.184  
Aside from controversial proposals regarding the recent past, the 
new Park government may also see a role for truth commissions, or truth 
commission-like entities, in other fields of investigation, such as North 
Korean affairs. Specifically, one could see pressure to use the truth 
commission model to investigate specific North Korean human rights 
abuses, or the fate of South Korean citizens abducted by the North Korean 
government in the post-Korean War era. Such commissions would be 
consistent with statements by Park Geun Hye and other conservatives that 
more emphasis must be placed on addressing human rights abuses in 
North Korea.185 One step in that general direction was the government’s 
March 2011 opening of the North Korea Human Rights Documentation 
Center and Archive, an organization based on West Germany’s Salzgitter 
                                                
180 Park Geun-Hye Should Make Genuine Effort to Reconcile, HANKYOREH, 
Aug. 30, 2012, http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_editorial/549453.html. 
181  Seong Yeon-cheol, Park Geun-hye to Traverse Father’s Legacy, 
HANKYOREH, May 13, 2011, 
http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/477817.html. 
182 Park Kyung-Man, Chang Chun-ha’s Family Hopes to Know Truth of his 
Death After 37 Years, HANKYOREH, Aug. 16, 2012, 
http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/547355.html; Lee Kyung-mi and 
Choi Yu-bin, A 28-year-old Plea to President Park Chung-hee, HANKYOREH, Sep. 27, 
2012, http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/553677.html (“A true 
apology will only be possible after there has been an investigation into the act, and an 
incomplete apology is worse than no apology at all.”). 
183 Kim Yun Hee, Gwagosa Jinsangjosa . . . Park Chung Hee Sidae 
Kukhan [Investigation of Nation’s Past . . . Limited to Park Chung Hee Era], HERALD 
KYUNGJAE (Jan. 24, 2013), 
http://news.heraldcorp.com/view.php?ud=20130124000424&md=20130127003916_AN. 
184 Kim Deok Ryun and Nam Bitnara, Park Geun Hye Kijuneun Park Chung Hee 
Myungae Hwoebok . . . Yoksa Jeonjang Beolil Keut [Park Geun Hye’s Historical Standard is the 
Recovery of Park Chung Hee’s Name…She will have a History War] PRESSIAN, Jan. 10, 2014, 
http://www.pressian.com/article/article.asp?article_num=60130109175226. 
185 See Bae Hyun-jung, Human Rights Watchdog Takes on N.K. Issue, KOREA 
HERALD, Mar. 30, 2010, available at 
http://nwww.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20090826000109. 
2013 Wolman 55 
Center that records instances of human rights abuses in North Korea.186 
Should the North Korean regime lose power at some point, it is quite 
likely that truth commissions will play a prominent role in the resulting 
transition. 
With continued conservative control of the presidency, it is also 
likely that we will see an increased focus on the creation of so-called 
‘truth commissions’ outside of government organs by various civil society 
organizations.187 For example, the recently formed Forum on Truth and 
Justice has attempted to take up the banner of the now-defunct TRCK in 
investigating and reporting on past abuses.188 To a certain extent, the truth 
commission model has already migrated to civil society over the past 
decade. This can be seen in the Korea Truth Commission on U.S. Military 
Massacres of Civilians, for example, which worked actively both in the 
United States and Korea to publicize incidences of wrongdoing by U.S. 
military forces.189 While it does not call itself a truth commission, the 
work of the Institute for Research in Collaborationist Activities is perhaps 
the most well known and controversial of the civil society truth-seeking 
initiatives.190 This organization has published lists of individuals who 
collaborated with the Japanese imperial regime.191 The Institute issued its 
first list of 3,096 collaborators in 2005, which included Park Chung Hee 
and several other prominent figures from the post-war era, and released 
another list of 1,686 names in 2008.192  
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Of course, the conservative party is unlikely to maintain power 
indefinitely in Korea, and at some point progressives will take over once 
more. At that point it is quite likely that calls from the left for new truth 
commissions will reemerge. Progressive civil society organizations, 
historians and political activists care deeply about the continuing 
imperative of truth-seeking, which they have promoted since November 
2004 through the campaigns of a coalition of civil society organizations, 
called the National Coalition for the Proper Settling of the Past.193 
Certainly, those on the left have made clear that they believe that the 
TRCK was not able to successfully complete its mandate, and there will 
be calls for its re-establishment.194 There will also be pressure to officially 
overturn certain pronouncements made by the TRCK during its 
conservative period. In addition, there may be calls to establish new issue-
specific truth commissions to address certain areas of the past that have 
not yet been thoroughly explored, such as human rights abuses committed 
by Korean soldiers in the Vietnam War. However, truth commissions 
evolve going forward, and it is clear that they have already informed 
Korean political affairs in numerous ways. While truth commissions may 
have garnered more publicity in Africa, Latin America and Europe, Korea 
is in fact one of the countries where they have played an extremely 
important role as the method of choice for dealing with the after effects of 
a particularly turbulent twentieth century.  
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